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From old to new industrial policy via 
economic regulation 
di Mark Thatcher 
ABSTRACT 
Major institutional reforms that have introduced economic regulation in 
Europe and elsewhere appear to have ended traditional industrial policies 
of favouring selected national champion suppliers. Privatisation, the dele-
gation of powers over mergers and acquisitions to the EU and independ-
ent competition authorities, new rules to ensure competition and prohibit 
state support to favoured companies and the end of planning, all appear 
to have led to a regulatory state. However, the article argues that regula-
tory reforms have in fact provided additional or alternative instruments for 
policy makers to favour European or international champion firms. The 
article analyses the different institutional reforms to show how they have 
provided instruments for policy makers to construct larger Europeanised 
and internationalised champion firms, shape markets through mergers 
and acquisitions, aid selected firms in liberalised markets, and to plan 
policies in ways that privilege chosen firms. It concludes that regulatory 
institutions are compatible with new forms industrial policy. 
SOMMARIO: 1. Introduction. – 2. From industrial policy to a regulatory state? A statist al-
ternative. – 3. Privatisation. – 4. Structuring markets – Mergers and acquisitions. – 5. 
State support for selected firms in competitive markets. – 6. Planning. – 7. Conclu-
sion. 
1. Introduction 
Industrial policy and economic regulation of markets are usually seen 
as opposites. Industrial policy involves political choices to favour select-
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ed ‘champion’ firms. In contrast, economic regulation is based on legal 
rules focused on competition. Major literatures on (neo)liberal institutions 
and the ‘regulatory state’ have argued that regulation designed to ensure 
competition and implemented by unelected institutions has increasingly 
replaced industrial policies in Europe and elsewhere. 
However, this article challenges the proposition that economic regula-
tion and industrial policy are always in conflict. It argues that they can be 
compatible, and indeed in Europe, the spread of economic regulation 
has in fact given rise to a new form of industrial policy. It does so by dis-
tinguishing the institutions of market regulation from instruments and 
their uses. It argues that although in Europe, traditional national industri-
al policies have been greatly reduced, market regulation designed to 
promote competition has provided new instruments, which have been 
used to support European champion firms. 
The article begins by outlining the key features of traditional industrial 
policy and the literature claiming a cross-national move towards ‘liber-
al’economic institutions and a ‘regulatory state’. It draws on recent ‘stat-
ist’literatures, which suggests that far from being diminished, state action 
can recur, but in new forms and that the state continues to promote do-
mestic firms despite liberalised markets. It seeks to develop this theme 
by showing how institutional changes have reduced or ended traditional 
industrial policy instruments but provided new ones to give rise to a new 
form of industrial policy in Europe. It examines four related major institu-
tional changes in regulation to illustrate its argument: privatisation; mer-
ger control; regulation of competition; medium-term planning. Empirical-
ly, it focuses on ‘regulated industries’, such as energy, telecommunica-
tions, railways, airlines, water, finance, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
since these were at the core of traditional industrial policy in Europe and 
have seen the greatest change towards regulatory institutions. Its con-
clusion suggests the processes through which the creation of regulatory 
institutions has aided or permitted the rise of a new form of industrial pol-
icy in Europe. 
2. From industrial policy to a regulatory state? A statist al-
ternative 
For several decades after 1945, ‘economic regulation’ was a term 
rarely used outside the US. Instead, many markets were dominated by 
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national ‘industrial policies’. Although several definitions of ‘industrial pol-
icy’ exist, at their core lies the concept that the state seeks to influence 
the supply side of the economy [1]. In Western Europe, industrial policies 
involved explicit state support for ‘national champion’ firms and/or for 
specific sectors [2]. They were pursued by elected politicians and their 
departmental civil servants executives at the national level, and some-
times also at subnational levels, together with the senior managers of 
state-owned and privately-owned ‘national champion’ suppliers, as well 
as representatives of labour. The state played direct roles in the structur-
ing and operation of economic market. It enjoyed considerable discretion 
and formal powers which it used to favour selected ‘national champion’ 
firms as part of objectives other than just ensuring competition, notably 
relating to developing the overall economy, national prestige or political 
advantage. 
Such industrial policies were dominant in many sectors – notably the 
network industries, but also others such as banking, finance, mineral ex-
traction and parts of manufacturing. They were seen in most West Euro-
pean countries, as well as Latin America and parts of Asia. Some na-
tional champion suppliers were privately owned. Others were publicly-
owned firms that sought to compete with private firms. Finally, there 
were publicly-owned monopolies, notably in network industries such as 
telecommunications, energy and transport. Although not organised and 
presented as commercial entities, these suppliers were central to im-
plementing policies of prioritisation of certain sectors, developing tech-
nologies and supporting other, more commercially oriented domestic 
firms. 
Of course important cross-national differences existed. Industrial poli-
cies in France were marked by ‘dirigisme’ and ‘grands projets’which saw 
close cooperation between the state and selected public and private 
suppliers and gave rise to technological advances on sectors such as 
high speed trains, telecommunications, nuclear energy and aerospa-
ce [3]. In contrast, Britain was often unable to promote such projects due 
to the gaps between public and private sectors, constraints on public 
	
	
1 D. GERADIN-I. GIRGENSON, Industrial policy and European merger control: A reas-
sessment, in International antitrust law and policy: Fordham competition law 2011, Juris, 
New York, 2011, pp. 353-382. 
2 Cf. J.E.S. HAYWARD (ed.), Industrial Enterprise and European Integration, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1995. 
3 See for instance, E. COHEN, Le colbertisme "high tech", Hachette, Paris, 1992. 
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spending and the power of the financial sector [4]. Industrial policies in 
Italy were marked by a multiplicity of actors and coordination being un-
dertaken by IRI. 
Industrial policy rested on an institutional framework that provided 
many instruments for national governments. One key pillar was public 
ownership of producers in major sectors such as banking and finance, 
manufacturing and extractive industries, or indeed sometimes entire in-
dustries, notably the network industries (then often called ‘public utili-
ties’). A second was that governments held most formal powers over 
mergers and acquisitions, providing influence over market structure. 
Third, governments enjoyed discretion and powers to support selected 
suppliers, be these state owned or privately owned – most legal powers 
lay in the hands of nation states who could made rules about the extent 
and form of competition and applied them. They had to act within consti-
tutional and legal limits, but these were broad, as judicialisation was low. 
Finally, governments engaged in planning, often creating specific organ-
isations and frameworks that set targets and determined investment. 
The most important cross-national contrast concerned the US, which 
had ‘regulation’. Policies often took the form of formal rules and there 
was a higher level of judicialisation compared with Europe. Regulation 
was based on institutions that differed somewhat from those in other 
capitalist countries. Public ownership was low, with private ownership of 
almost all firms, including in telecommunications and finance. Regulatory 
powers were held by independent ‘commissions’, with their own mem-
bers appointed for fixed terms of office, such as the FCC (Federal 
Communications Commission) or SEC (Securities and Exchange Com-
mission). Nevertheless, the US was seen as an exception. Interesting-
ly,and importantly for the argument here, regulation did ot prevent the 
US from having its own forms of industrial policy, notably the promotion 
of large firms, barriers to overseas entry and a powerful ‘military-
industrial complex’. 
However, from the 1980s onwards, the institutions traditionally under-
pinning industrial policies in Europe were abolished or reformed: state-
owned enterprises were privatised; governments lost many legal powers 
over monopolies and mergers both to the European Commission and to 
national ‘independent regulatory authorities’(IRAs); they also lost legal 
powers to support selected suppliers, as legal monopolies were ended, 
competition was enshrined in law as a major principle and objective of 
	
	
4 P.A. HALL, Governing the Economy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986.  
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policy and the powers of the EU and IRAs grew; planning organisations 
were abolished or severely weakened. These changes formed part of 
the spread of ‘liberal’ economic institutions that reduced the direct role of 
the state to shape markets and more broadly the (re)turn to neo-liberal 
ideas centred on competitive markets and a strong but limited state ded-
icated to policing such competition [5]. Table 1 summarises the altered 
institutional framework. 
Table 1. – Institutions underpinning industrial policy and the rise of regulation 
 Industrial policy Regulation 
Ownership Large scale public owner-
ship of suppliers 
Privatisation of many 
state-owned enterprises 
and suppliers 
Powers over market 
structure 
Government powers over 
mergers and acquisitions 
Powers over monopolies 
and mergers held by the 
EU and independent regu-
latory agencies 
Aiding selecting suppliers Government powers and 
discretion over support for 
selected national suppliers 
Powers and regulation to 
ensure ‘fair competition’ 
given to EU and inde-
pendent regulatory agen-
cies 
Planning Planning organisations and 
medium/long-term plans for 
outcomes and investment 
Planning greatly limited – 
investment and outcomes 
to be determined by mar-
ket competition  
 
Institutional and ideational changes appeared to end industrial policy. 
Indeed, one influential line of analysis suggests that they have led to the 
development of the ‘regulatory state’ or ‘regulatory capitalism’ [6]. Alt-
	
	
5 B. SIMMONS-Z. ELKINS, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the In-
ternational Political Economy, in American Political Science Review, 98/1, 2004, pp. 171-
189; B. SIMMONS-F. DOBBIN-G. GARRETT, Introduction: The International Diffusion of Lib-
eralism, in International Organization, 60/4, 2006, pp. 781-810; for a general discussion 
of neo-liberal ideas, see V. SCHMIDT-M. THATCHER, Resilient Liberalism in Europe’s Politi-
cal Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013. 
6 G. MAJONE (ed.), Regulating Europe, Routledge, London, 1996; G. MAJONE, From the 
positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of 
Governance, in Journal of Public Policy, 17/2, 1997, pp. 139-167; D. LEVI-FAUR-J. JORDANA, 
The Rise of Regulatory Capitalism: The Global Diffusion of a New Order, in The Annals of 
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hough neither neo-liberalism nor the regulatory state analyses suggest 
the end of the state, its role was argued to be fundamentally different 
from that in traditional industrial policy. It was argued to become much 
more indirect, with central parts being played by non-majoritarian institu-
tions, notably independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) [7]. In contrast, 
elected politicians, government departments and nationalised industries 
were argued to have lost importance. Regulation was to be focused on 
ensuring competition, unlike the multiple wider or political goals of indus-
trial policy. Equally it was highly legalised, in contrast to the discretionary 
and highly politicised style of previous policy. Finally, supranational regu-
lation, especially by the EU, was growing. Overall, an active role for na-
tional governments enjoying discretion to shape markets and privilege 
national firms seemed to be in decline or even largely terminated. 
However, claims for a move towards a more indirect and competition-
focused state role have recently faced a new growing ‘statist’literature. 
This argues that far from retreating, the state remain a central actor in 
markets and although old forms of state action may decline, new forms 
can arise [8]. Indeed, a new economic ‘constitution’ can be born [9]. It ar-
gues that even in the face of internationally open economic markets, 
states pursue policies that favour selected domestic firms, seeking ‘eco-
nomic nationalism’ or ‘economic patriotism’ [10]. It distinguishes between 
the aims of policy – which can be highly nationalistic and selective– and 
the forms of policy, notably its instruments [11]. Hence it argues that 
	
	
the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 598 /1, 2005, pp. 12-32. 
7 M. THATCHER-A. STONE SWEET (eds.), The Politics of Delegation, special issue of 
West European Politics, 25/1, 2002; F. GILARDI, Delegation in the Regulatory State: In-
dependent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008. 
8 J. LEVY (ed.), The State after Statism: New State Activities in the Age of Liberaliza-
tion, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2006; V.A. SCHMIDT, Putting the Political 
Back into Political Economy by Bringing the State Back Yet Again, in World Politics, 61/ 
3, 2009, pp. 516-548; S. CASSESE, L’arena pubblica. Nuovi paradigmi per lo Stato, in Riv. 
trim. dir. pubbl., 2001, pp. 601-650.  
9 S. CASSESE, La nuova costituzione economica, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2000; cf. S. 
WILKS, Competition policy, in D. COEN-W. GRANT-G. WILSON (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Business and Government, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 730-756. 
10 B. CLIFT-C. WOLL, Economic Patriotism: Reinventing Control Over Open Markets, 
in Journal of European Public Policy, 19/3, 2012, pp. 307-323, E. HELLEINER, Economic 
nationalism as a challenge to economic liberalism? Lessons from the 19th century, in 
International Studies Quarterly, 46/3, 2002, pp. 307-329, E. HELLEINER-A. PICKEL, Eco-
nomic nationalism in a globalizing world, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 2005. 
11 Cf. P. LASCOUMES-P. LE GALES (eds.), Gouverner par les instruments, Presses de 
Sciences Po, Paris, 2004. 
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states can engage in selective liberalisation, which favours certain na-
tional firms which gain from the opening of markets. Thus liberalisation 
of markets can form part of state strategies to aid domestic firms. This is 
especially so because the state also re-regulates competition [12], which 
offers opportunities to shape markets and favour certain firms, either by 
aiding competition or by limiting it and seeking to protect existing suppli-
ers. Hence focusing on traditional forms of industrial policy such as sub-
sidies or tariffs may miss newer instruments that operate through selec-
tively extending competition and influencing its operation. Studies sug-
gest that even the US has found new instruments to pursue industrial 
development, through a largely invisible development network state, par-
ticularly to promote new technologies [13]. The economic crises of the 
2000s have drawn further attention to the roles of the state, since in 
many countries governments stepped in to rescue failing firms, subsidise 
others or lead restructuring [14]. 
Thus there is a developing debate about whether liberalisation and 
regulation of markets mean the end of an active state that privileges cer-
tain firms. Although the term ‘industrial policy’ is rarely used, this is at the 
core of the discussion. The statist analyses claim that the state has dis-
cretion to shape competition which it uses to favour selected firms, 
whereas work on the regulatory state claims there is a movement to-
wards less political discretion and more legal or quasi-legal application 
of rules in pursuit of extending competition, so that national states can 
no longer favour privileged firms such as ‘national champions’. The ‘stat-
ist’literature is valuable in countering work that has underplaying the 
continuing direct roles of governments in markets, roles that were 
strongly revealed after 2008. Equally, it is very valuable in distinguishing 
aims and instruments. But it calls for analysis of the processes whereby 
certain kinds of state activity in markets arise. Finally, comparison be-
tween past industrial policy and current state activities could be valuable 
in assessing what remains from past policies and what is new. 
The following sections therefore discuss the key institutional changes 
in the move towards regulatory institutions, looking at how it has affected 
the instruments available to policy makers (elected and unelected). They 
	
	
12 Cf. S. VOGEL, Freer Markets, More Rules, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, 1998. 
13 F. BLOCK, Swimming against the current: The rise of a hidden developmental state 
in the United States, in Politics & Society, 36/2, 2008, pp. 169-206. 
14 Cf. W. GRANT-G. WILSON (eds.), The consequences of the global financial crisis, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; G. NAPOLITANO (ed.), Uscire della crisi: politiche 
pubbliche e trasformazione istituzionali, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2012. 
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examine whether and how the institutional changes have affected in-
struments for pursuing industrial policy, defined as the capacity to select 
and favour certain firms. They compare the current instruments available 
following (neo)-liberal institutional changes with those provided by previ-
ous institutions to examine whether new forms of industrial policy have 
developed to replace or overlay traditional forms. 
3. Privatisation 
Public ownership of suppliers lay at the heart of post-1945 industrial poli-
cy in Europe. It was very wide in most countries, covering network indus-
tries such as telecommunications energy, railways, water and airlines and 
often stock exchanges. However it also extended to manufacturing, such as 
cars, aerospace, mineral extraction and working (coal, steel, oil), large parts 
of finance (banking, insurance) and transport. Public ownership varied a lit-
tle in extent across countries (for instance, being somewhat more limited in 
the UK than say France and Italy) and form (being more national in France 
than Germany, or more indirect in Italy through IRI than in France). 
Public ownership of suppliers provided governments with direct and 
indirect policy tools to promote industrial policy. It provided suppliers 
who could then enjoy privileged treatment, often in the name of ‘the pub-
lic good’. In network sectors, this took the form of legal doctrines of ‘ser-
vice public’or ‘servizio pubblico’ [15]. Public ownership aided govern-
ments to structure markets, deciding how many suppliers should exist 
and their size; indeed, nationalisation of firms in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s was often linked to merging several suppliers in order to create 
large ‘national champion’ suppliers (for instance, in cars or steel). There-
after, state-owned suppliers allowed provision of orders and other forms 
of support to privately-owned firms. Other policy instruments were influ-
encing prices, investment and the selection and development of new 
technologies. Government policy choices about which firms and sectors 
to support often passed through the decisions of state-owned suppliers. 
Privatisation has swept through Europe, as well as other parts of the 
world [16]. In Europe, ‘privatisation’ has at least two senses: legal trans-
	
	
15 G.F. CARTEI, Il servizio universale, Giuffrè, Milano, 2002; R. PEREZ, Telecomuni-
cazioni e concorrenza, Giuffrè, Milano, 2002. 
16 Among the many works on privatisation, especially in network industries, see J. 
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formation into a company; transfer of ownership from the public to the 
private sector [17]. In the first sense, almost all suppliers have been pri-
vatized – including postal operators (e.g. Deutsche Post, the Post Office, 
La Poste). Moreover, in the second sense, ownership of many state-
owned enterprises has also been transferred to the private sector. Thus 
for example, most telecommunications operators, banks, car companies 
and airlines have been sold off [18], plus a majority of energy suppliers. 
Even some railway and postal operators have been privatised (e.g. 
Deutsche Bahn and the railways in the UK). 
At first sight, privatisation might seem to prevent or at least restrict in-
dustrial policies. The ‘public interest’rationale for favouring selected firms 
is greatly weakened if they are privately-owned. Equally, their owners 
will seek profits, and their managements will face pressures to maximise 
‘shareholder value’ in the short-term, rather than following government 
policies. Firms can be expected to set prices and investment for their 
strategies rather than government ones. 
However, whilst privatisation may have weakened traditional instru-
ments, it has also offered alternative instruments that allow national 
governments to follow new forms of industrial policy. Legal privatisation 
has aided state-owned suppliers to become more clearly ‘national 
champion’ firms. They have adopted commercial practices and identi-
ties, expanded into new competitive markets and sought to expand 
abroad. Examples here are postal and railway operators such as La 
Poste or SNCF in France. 
Moreover, legal privatisation and then partial sale of state shares have 
aided state-owned enterprises to expand, especially overseas, and hence 
become larger ‘international’state-owned champions. The state-owned 
firms have been able to raise capital both directly and by borrowing, since 
	
	
CLIFTON-F. COMIN-D. DIAZ FUENTES, Privatizing public enterprises in the European Union 
1960-2002: ideological, pragmatic, inevitable?, in Journal of European Public Policy, 
13/5, 2006, pp. 736-756, H. FEIGENBAUM-J. HENIG-C. HAMNETT, Shrinking the State, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998; V. SCHNEIDER-S. FINK-M. TENBUCKEN, Buying 
Out the State, in Comparative Political Studies, 38/6, 2005, pp. 704-727; B. BORTOLOTTI-
D. SINISCALCO (eds.), The Challenges of Privatization. An International Analysis, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004, G. ROLAND (ed.), Privatization: Successes and Failures, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 2008; V. WRIGHT (ed.), Privatisation in Western 
Europe, Pinter, London, 1994. 
17 C. SCHMITT, The Janus Face of Europeanisation: Explaining Cross-Sectoral Dif-
ferences in Public Utilities, in West European Politics, 36/3, 2013, pp. 547-563.  
18 For example, British Telecom, Telecom Italia, France Télécom/Orange, Deutsche 
Telekom. 
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such companies enjoy good credit ratings. In turn the capital has permit-
ted these partially privatised firms to take cross-shares in other companies 
or purchase them. Legal and partial privatisation have also helped state-
owned firms to form alliances with fully privately-owned firms. Thus for ex-
ample, Gaz de France was partially privatised which allowed it to merge 
with Suez to form a large French-based international gas firm, while EDF 
too has become the largest European electricity firm, buying up many 
overseas producers, especially in Europe. Similarly, ENI and ENEL have 
been partially privatised, and been able to expand abroad. 
Even full privatisation has offered instruments for governments to 
pursue industrial policy. It has created powerful fully-privately owned 
firms such as Telecom Italia, British Telecom, British Airways or BP. 
These are internally and externally organised to compete and expand 
both domestically into new markets and internationally. In turn, national 
policy makers have been able to promote them through new means. 
Thus for example, as suggested by work on ‘liberal’ nationalism or ‘eco-
nomic patriotism’, the UK sought international liberalisation of air 
transport as part of a strategy to aid British Airways [19]. Similarly, it and 
other European countries such as France pressed the US to allow over-
seas purchases of American network operators (for instance, in tele-
communications), offering liberalisation and privatisation as part of the 
creation of international alliances with American firms to gain [20]. Thus 
for instance, European governments have sought liberalisation of mar-
kets and acceptance of overseas takeovers in the US and in Latin Amer-
ica in markets such as telecommunications and airlines [21]. At the same 
time, national governments have offered these private internationalised 
champions state support through regulation, international negotiations or 
protection against takeovers (discussed below). Suppliers that were pre-
viously organised as domestic ‘public services’ akin to welfare services 
(e.g. network industries) or as clubs (e.g. stock exchanges), are now in-
ternational firms but with strong links to one or more nations, represent-
ing a significant extension of industrial policy [22]. 
	
	
19 M. STANILAND, Government Birds: Air Transport and the State in Western Europe, 
Rowman and Littlefield, Boulder, CO, 2003; H. KASSIM-H. STEVENS, Air Transport and the 
European Union, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2009. 
20 M. THATCHER, Internationalisation and economic institutions: comparing national 
experiences, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. 
21 For example in the ‘open skies’ negotiations by the UK and France to open up 
transatlantic traffic for BA and Air France. 
22 M. THATCHER, Internationalisation and economic institutions: comparing national 
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Finally, legal privatisation has been combined with the development of 
new forms of public ownership. Companies backed by government guaran-
tee have been created, which have private company structures but are in 
fact a public responsibility. Thus for instance, in the UK, although the rail-
way infrastructure was sold to the private sector in 1996, when the operator, 
Railtrack in 2001, collapsed, it was taken over by Network Rail – which is 
legally has a private company but whose debt is guaranteed by the state 
(indeed, after a long debate, the UK government was obliged to include it 
within state spending and debt). State ownership through state-owned 
banks and lenders offers a further form of public ownership. Thus for exam-
ple, the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, the Kfw (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) 
or the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations all have substantial share 
holdings. New forms have been created with ‘sovereign wealth funds’ such 
as the French Fonds Stratégique d’Investissement or the UK ‘UK Financial 
Investments’, a ‘private’ company which holds the state’s bank shares fol-
lowing rescues of RBS and Lloyds. Indeed, it should be noted that while 
significant privatisation has taken place, public ownership has returned in 
these new forms, especially after the financial crisis of 2007/8. 
Hence privatisation has offered national policy makers alternative in-
struments for industrial policies, notably through creating partially privat-
ised international champions, private law firms that are an indirect state 
responsibility and then fully private firms that are nationally – rooted and 
supported. The changes arising from the shift from traditional public own-
ership to private law and private ownership are summarised in table 2. 
Table 2. – Ownership and policy instruments 
Traditional industrial policy 
Public ownership 
Privatisation 
Public suppliers as part of pro-
tecting public interest 
Private law state – owned companies 
Creation of state – owned na-
tional champions 
Creation of partially state – owned interna-
tional champions and expanded national-
based private champions 
Direct public responsibility via 
ownership 
Indirect state responsibility through guaran-
tees and state holding companies 
	
	
experiences, cit. 
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4. Structuring markets – Mergers and acquisitions 
A key purpose of structuring markets in traditional European industrial 
policy was to develop large ‘national champions’, both publicly and pri-
vately – owned, with the aim that these suppliers would enjoy economies 
of scale and world-market size. National policy makers held powers over 
mergers and acquisitions; indeed, in some countries there were no spe-
cific merger authorities and very few legal rules. Governments could use 
their powers to allow mergers and acquisitions that formed part of their 
industrial strategies, notably expansion by ‘national champions’, includ-
ing state-owned enterprises. Conversely, governments could block un-
desired market restructuring, especially hostile foreign takeovers. Just 
the threat of such action was usually sufficient to ward off overseas 
predators, a situation that prevailed even in a ‘liberal’ market economy 
such as the UK. 
A major institutional change since the late 1980s has been the great 
reduction of the legal powers and discretion of national governments 
over mergers and acquisitions. Thus for instance, under the 1989 Euro-
pean Merger Control Regulation, most large mergers and acquisitions 
are decided by the European Commission – with thresholds that catch 
most major acquisitions [23]. The Commission acts almost entirely using 
competition criteria– whether the merger creates a ‘significant impedi-
ment to competition’ and has little legal scope for looking at other crite-
ria [24]. Even when mergers fall under national jurisdictions, almost all 
European countries have created independent competition authorities 
who act under legislation that is focused on whether a merger could im-
pede competition. Often elected politicians have lost their previous direct 
powers over mergers – for example, in the UK, under the 2002 Enter-
prise Act, government ministers can only block a merger on very narrow 
grounds such as national security. 
Yet while these institutional changes in merger powers, in combina-
	
	
23 Since 1997, aggregate worldwide turnover of more than 2.5 billion ECU and com-
bined aggregate turnover in each of at least three Member States of 100 million ECU, 
with the turnover of at least two of the firms being more than 25 million ECU and aggre-
gate EU-wide turnover of at least two of the firms being 100 million ECU (Regulation 
1310/97). 
24 For legal discussions see D.G. GOYDER, EC competition law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2003; G. MONTI, EC competition law, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2007, Chapter 8; R. WHISH-D. BAILEY, Competition law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012. 
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tion with privatisation and the end of legal monopolies, have reduced the 
scope for traditional industrial policies to structure markets, they have 
paradoxically contributed to the development of European champions. 
Most large mergers attempted have been between European firms, ei-
ther cross-border or domestic. Thus in three major sectors – banking, 
energy and telecommunications – 60% of all mergers were cross-border 
European ones (i.e. forms from at least two separate EU member 
states), 14% were domestic within an EU member state and only 14% 
were non-EU firms merging with European ones [25]. Even these small 
figures in the last category over-estimate the entry of non-European 
firms into the EU as they include European firms taking over non-EU 
ones and hence represent internationalisation of European firms rather 
than real non-European entry into European markets. Although the Eu-
ropean Commission has only used competition criteria in making deci-
sions, the interpretation and application of those criteria have permitted 
many mergers to be approved. Thus for example, between 1990 and 
2009, only 2 out of 394 mergers in telecommunications and energy were 
prohibited by the Commission and not a single one in banking out of 187 
cases [26]. 
The result has been the development ‘European champions’ as well 
as larger national ones through mergers and acquisitions. Firms that 
were previously largely domestic have both retained their home base 
and also expanded in other European countries. Some are privately 
owned champions – for example, French banks such as Crédit Agricole 
or la Société Générale or the UK-based mobile operator Vodafone. Oth-
ers are previously state-owned suppliers who have become commercial 
enterprises – for instance, Euronext, which was built from the French, 
Belgian and Dutch stock exchanges, and then merged with the New 
York Stock Exchange. A third group are partially state-owned firms, such 
as EdF, Enel, Eni or Orange (formerly France Télécom). All have grown 
thanks for substantial mergers and acquisitions that the Commission has 
approved. Very importantly for industrial policy, the Commission and na-
tional regulatory authorities have permitted vertical (re)integration by 
large firms in sectors such as energy or transport, including in domestic 
	
	
25 M. THATCHER, European Commission merger control: Combining competition and 
the creation of larger European firms, in European Journal of Political Research, 53/3, 
2014, pp. 443-464. 
26 M. THATCHER, European Commission merger control: Combining competition and 
the creation of larger European firms, cit. 
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markets. The result is that a small number of major firms (often 3-4) now 
dominate important segments of most national markets in network indus-
tries such as mobile telecommunications, the fixed line network, energy 
distribution and generation and parts of finance. 
Although national policy makers, especially governments, have lost 
many legal powers over mergers and acquisitions, their interventions 
have continued, using alternative instruments. At times, they have en-
couraged mergers between certain firms. Sometimes, this takes place 
early in the process, before formal merger control begins. It can start 
through privatisation itself, as national officials choose to create or 
strengthen national or Europeanised champions through their choice of 
purchasers. Thus for example, France, under the centre-left Jospin gov-
ernment, transferred a large part of Aérospatial to the privately-owned 
Matra corporation to create EADS – a European champion. A third in-
strument has been for governments to select ‘white knights’ or favoured 
partners for national champions, which allow them to influence the dom-
inant market players. Some of these are domestic firms but others are 
international. One example of the former is the merger between Gaz de 
France and Suez in 2008, which prevented the latter company falling in-
to rival hands, while in 2007 Telecom Italia was ‘saved’ from the atten-
tions of AT&T by the Spanish operator Telefonica taking a large 
stake [27], as was Alitalia, whose ‘Italian’ status was secured in 2008 by 
a sale to a consortium of domestic investors [28]. In all these cases, the 
governments played a central role in orchestrating the white knight ma-
noeuvre. 
Conversely, national policy makers have been able to discourage 
unwanted mergers and takeovers, especially by non-European firms. 
For a start, states still maintain large shares in some firms or ‘golden 
shares’, which although under great legal attack, create potential com-
mercial obstacles in terms of delay and controversy. Hence for example, 
the French state retains substantial shares in firms such as France Télé-
com/Orange and GDF-Suez. Governments and IRAs can also modify or 
threaten to modify regulatory frameworks so make certain acquisitions 
more or less attractive. A major example occurred in Italy when the US 
firm AT&T seemed poised to acquire Telecom Italia – the Italian gov-
ernment and also its IRA began to threaten to restructure the telecom-
	
	
27 Telefonica in 2014 began to exit its stake. 
28 Later Air France took a large stake, but then in 2014 the Arabian airline Etihad 
took a major share. 
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munications system to enforce vertical separation between the network 
and services, which would have made Telecom Italia much less attrac-
tive; when AT&T withdrew its interest, vertical separation also ceased to 
a possible regulatory option. Finally, politicisation of mergers and acqui-
sitions has sometimes hindered acquisitions. In banking, certain takeo-
vers have become highly politicised, raising domestic opposition and 
discussions of unwanted foreign takeovers – seen for instance, in Italian 
banking in the 2000s (e.g. bids for Antonveneta and BNL were bitterly 
resisted, amongst others by Antonio Fazio, then governor of the Bank of 
Italy). Even in Britain, the most ‘liberal’ economy in Europe for takeovers, 
the American firm Pfizer’s attempt to take over Astra Zeneca in 2014 
created considerable political controversy, with parliamentary questions 
and committee enquiries, and was quickly ended. 
Table 3 summarises the instruments available to national policy mak-
ers under traditional industrial policy and then in the new institutional 
framework in which many powers over mergers and acquisitions lie in 
the hands of the EU and national independent competition authorities. 
Table 3. – Powers over mergers and acquisitions 
Traditional Industrial Policy Regulation by the EU and inde-
pendent competition authorities 
Purchase of domestic firms by state-
owned enterprises to create ‘national 
champions’ 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
to create European champions 
Mergers and acquisitions among pri-
vately-owned firms 
Sale of state-owned enterprises to se-
lected privately-owned firms 
Prevention of mergers and acquisitions 
of domestic firms by overseas firms  
White knights 
 Golden shares 
 Regulatory changes 
 Political attention 
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5. State support for selected firms in competitive markets 
Under traditional post-1945 industrial policy, national policy makers 
could direct support to selected suppliers through a series of instru-
ments. The most obvious was legal monopoly, which prevented direct 
competition and allowed policy makers to set prices. This was closely 
linked to public ownership, especially in network industries. However, 
even when competition was permitted by law, the state could shape and 
limit it through national standards, which privileged firms found easy to 
meet whereas others (especially foreign companies) found such stand-
ards difficult and expensive to comply with. They could also influence or 
indeed set ‘administered prices’. Equally, policy makers could provide 
direct and indirect subsidies to favoured suppliers. In addition, they could 
provide support through public orders, and less directly through publicly 
– owned banks or cooperation over research and development. 
Regulatory institutions have greatly curbed the legal scope for such 
instruments. Thus for instance, legal monopolies in almost all network 
industries have been outlawed by EU law and replaced with re-regula-
tion of competition designed to ensure ‘fair and effective competition’. [29] 
Equally, non – tariff barriers to trade, including national standards, have 
mostly been outlawed by EU and international law. State aid and public 
procurement are regulated by the EU, which legally is bound to prevent 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. Government subsidies are regu-
lated by EU rules on state aid, and have greatly been reduced – for ex-
ample, for the EU as whole, it went down from 1.085% of GDP in 1992 
to 0.669 in 2000 to 0.521% in 2012 [30]. Public financing of investment 
has been severely constrained by fiscal targets and by the privatisation 
of state-owned banks. Systems of government-determined ‘administered 
prices’ have been greatly curbed. 
Nevertheless, national policy makers have found considerable scope 
for aiding selected ‘national’ or European champions. Although legal 
monopolies have largely been ended, licensing (or authorisation) and li-
cence conditions have offered powerful tools to aid national champions 
in many industries – from network sectors to finance. Sometimes the 
	
	
29 M. THATCHER, Internationalisation and economic institutions: comparing national 
experiences, cit. 
30 Excluding railways and crisis aid; source – European Commission data – for figures 
and detailed national figures, see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm_comp/table.do?tab=-
table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=comp_ncr_xrl_02 – last accessed 9 November 2014. 
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number of licences affects how many suppliers exist in a market. Even 
when ‘competition’ is an official policy objective, governments can pro-
tect existing suppliers through obstructing new licences. One example is 
French third generation mobile telecommunications networks, where ini-
tially only three licences were issued and it took years for a fourth 3G li-
cence to be issued, thereby protecting existing French suppliers (Or-
ange, SFR and Bouygues). But perhaps more important are licence 
terms which influence the attractiveness of entry and the extent to which 
firms are really competitors. Thus for example, rules about sharing of in-
frastructures affects whether there is competition in providing such infra-
structures or whether just in resale, which matters greatly for outcomes 
such as price and competitive pressure. Equally in areas such as bank-
ing, rules about ‘structural separation’ that involve dividing banking activ-
ities, capital requirements, passporting of bank account numbers or spe-
cific additional obligations for ‘systemically important’ banks affect the 
number of effective players in markets and the attractiveness of entry. 
Sometimes stricter regulation has effects such as reducing the attrac-
tiveness of entry and hence protecting existing national champions– for 
instance, capital requirements in finance. 
Another key element of licensing concerns tariffs. Although wide-
spread administered prices have been ended, some governments still 
have limited legal powers over prices for final services. Thus, for in-
stance, the French government holds powers over the setting of basic 
energy tariffs. However, of much greater importance is direct regulation 
by IRAs of tariffs in major industries, especially network sectors. Hence 
for example, many energy, communication and rail prices are controlled 
by formulae interpreted and sometimes set by IRAs. In turn, this allows 
scope for IRAs to influence the profitability of major suppliers, who are 
often ‘national’ or European champions, such as EDF, Orange or Tele-
com Italia. More indirectly but equally important, licence terms affect 
which costs are included in calculating tariffs, which are often based on 
a ‘cost plus’ formula, notably in infrastructure industries. A key issue is 
whether investment and capacity costs are allowable: if costs such as 
spare generating capacity or universal service are included, then exist-
ing suppliers can both reinforce their market share and also protect prof-
its. In recent years, concern about ensuring sufficient capacity in sectors 
such as energy or telecommunications has increased, and even the Eu-
ropean Commission has officially underlined its importance [31]. 
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Whilst formal non-crisis state aid has fallen over recent decades, new 
forms of state support have emerged. Governments and central banks 
have offered explicit or implicit guarantees to major national champions 
in times of need – from France Télécom in 2002 to large banks and fi-
nancial institutions after the crisis of 2007 (e.g. Monte dei Paschi di Si-
ena in Italy in 2009 and 2013). Cross-subsidies for desirable policy aims 
represent another instrument. These have been used for example in the 
energy sector to favour renewable energy in several countries, including 
Germany. Tax arrangements offer another instruments – they can be 
designed to favour certain sectors (e.g. finance) or to transfer financial 
responsibility for risky, large debts (e.g. the costs of nuclear waste dis-
posal or ‘toxic debts’ in banks). Long-term state orders and agreements 
provide a further instrument for national policy makers to promote se-
lected firms. Sometimes this is direct, as when orders are given to such 
firms. But at other times, it is less visible, as when policy makers negoti-
ate with overseas states, offering access to domestic markets in return 
for orders from those states for national champions. Thus for example, 
UK and French policy makers have welcomed investment by sovereign 
wealth funds from countries such as China and Qatar, in return for which 
they have sought orders and market access for favoured national com-
panies in fields such as nuclear energy and banking. These ‘quid pro 
quos’ allow policy makers to aid national champions to gain overseas 
orders. 
Although national standards that hindered overseas entry have been 
under attack from both EU law and the growth of European and interna-
tional standards. Some follow traditional technological standards – i.e. 
concern equipment. Thus for instance, the EU has set standards for new 
mobile communications networks that apply across Europe. But many 
standards are now regulatory, especially by the EU as part of the single 
market process. They concern matters such as capital standards, provi-
sion of information or accounting, in industries from finance to energy. 
Creating these standards is often slow and involves detailed European 
negotiations. EU regulation to remove specific barriers to cross – border 
trade such as cross-national energy grid capacity particularly aid the de-
velopment of large, pan-European firms. 
Thus while traditional instruments of state support such as subsidies, 
orders and national standards have become increasingly legally con-
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strained, new instruments for supporting selected firms, notably national 
and especially Europeanised champions, have emerged. Table 4 sets 
out the traditional and new tools available for state support. 
Table 4. – State support for selected firms 
Traditional Industrial Policy Liberalisation and re-regulation of 
competition 
Legal monopoly Licensing 
National technological standards European and national regulatory 
standards 
Prices set by governments Regulated tariffs 
Subsidies State guarantees; cross-subsidies; tax 
arrangements 
Public orders Long-term state contracts; overseas 
orders 
State-private cooperation on R&D  
6. Planning 
Medium and long-term planning was a central part of industrial policy 
after 1945. In most countries, it was led by governments and specialised 
planning agencies. Their activities involved not just setting macro-
economic targets but also public signalling of investment priorities for 
both the public and private sectors (for instance, special importance was 
given to certain industrial sectors such as energy or telecommunica-
tions). Planning often also meant selecting particular technologies (e.g. a 
particular technology for nuclear energy), and balancing different objec-
tives, such as national autonomy, regional development, building a tech-
nological lead or national security. Forms of signalling varied across 
countries. In some, such as France, centralised national agencies set 
out goals for several years, and sought to allocate or direct investment to 
sectors. In others such as the UK, planning was much more indicative. 
Although medium-term official government macro-economic planning 
has been mostly ended, and planning organisations abolished or down-
graded (even in France), new forms of sectoral planning have emerged. 
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Governments have set medium and long-term targets for sectors such 
as energy, transport and telecommunications. Frequently, these targets 
concern the behaviour and decisions of privately – owned firms, and 
have translated into long-term investment programmes and contracts – 
from nuclear energy to ‘fourth generation’ communication networks to 
high speed rail programmes, in countries as diverse as Britain and 
France. Equally, independent regulatory agencies engage in a form of 
planning by their decisions concerning which costs are allowable in set-
ting price controls and their direct negotiations with major suppliers over 
medium-term investment. One example concerns water in the UK, 
where the regulator has set price formulae according to plans for capital 
spending and agreed targets for such spending, thereby in effect engag-
ing in medium-term investment planning. 
Policy makers have also implicitly or explicitly influenced choices of 
technology through their sectoral investment plans and also tax and 
(cross) subsidies. Hence for instance, governments and IRAs have tak-
en very direct roles in decisions about energy mixes, notably between 
nuclear and renewables, through instruments such as nuclear and re-
newable levies, long-term investment contracts for nuclear energy or 
regulation of tariffs and rights to sell renewably-generated electricity. In 
transport, government planning decisions about new airports or high 
speed train lines (e.g. the current debate about where to locate a third 
London runway or the planned HS2 high-speed rail link in the UK or the 
Turin-Lyon rail link) all shape choices about transport technology. In con-
trast to traditional industrial policies, the technologies chosen have often 
been developed by European or international groups – for instance, Eu-
ropean high speed rail or airlines or different forms of energy generation 
offered by consortia such as Airbus or specially-created consortia that 
bring together national firms and European champions such as EDF and 
Areva. 
Although competition has been a central regulatory goal, other objec-
tives have become increasingly important, especially in the 2000s, many 
of them similar to previous industrial policy aims. Security of supply has 
achieved increasing prominence, especially in energy, and been a major 
argument for new nuclear power stations and also for building storage 
and grid capacity. Regional development has driven policies about 
transport, such as new high speed rail links (e.g. HS2) or airport capaci-
ty. Externalities, regional development and also equality have all been 
important considerations in policies for broadband and mobile networks. 
These aims however, have often been pursued through a combination 
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of direct financing and regulatory instruments. Direct financing has come 
from both national governments and from the EU, through its structural 
funds and more recently, its plans for investment programmes run through 
the European Investment Bank. However, they also occur through regula-
tory instruments, which are much less visible. Thus achieving security of 
supply and additional capacity can occur through price formulae that allow 
infrastructure providers to pass on certain costs. Equally, medium-term 
price controls can be linked to investment programmes (e.g. in water, en-
ergy or transport). They can also be achieved through regulation that al-
lows sharing of infrastructure (e.g. for telecommunications), which in turn 
makes certain investments more profitable. 
The relationship between planning and individual national champion 
firms is less strong today than the heyday of industrial policy, when it in-
volved explicit choices about support for individual firms. Nevertheless, 
the long-term planning of the 2000s does aid a limited number of firms, 
since many regulated markets are dominated by a small number of Eu-
ropean champions. Thus for example, regulation and planning to ensure 
high investment in new mobile networks generally aids existing major 
suppliers such as Orange or Vodafone. Indeed, the European Commis-
sion itself, supposedly the guardian of competition, increasingly supports 
concentration of sectors such as network industries in order to ensure 
high levels of investment and coverage [32]. 
Table 5 summarises the contrasts between the instruments for planning 
under traditional industrial policy and then with regulatory institutions. 
Table 5. – Instruments for planning 
Traditional industrial policy Regulatory institutions 
Public priorities and targets for sectors Sectoral target outcomes for private 
suppliers 
State funding for investment in select-
ed sectors 
Public agreement to private investment 
plans; tax; cross-subsidies 
	
	
32 For instance, in 2014 it approved both a merger between Telefonica Deutschland 
and E-Plus, reducing the number of mobile operators in Germany from four to three – 
see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Case M.7018, Telefonica Deutschland/E-Plus; equally, a Di-
rective in 2014 encouraged the sharing of infrastructure in broadband telecommunica-
tions, thereby reducing the incentives for competition among networks – Directive 
2014/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on measures 
to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic communications. 
 29
Choice of certain national technologies Choice of internationally-available tech-
nologies 
Public orders and coordination in pur-
suit of wider aims than competition– 
e.g. regional development, national au-
tonomy, security, technological lead 
Regulatory instruments in pursuit of 
wider aims – e.g. security of supply,  
7. Conclusion 
National policy makers pursued traditional industrial policies using in-
struments available from a well-established institutional framework. 
Some elements of that framework continue to exist, such as limited ex-
plicit public ownership or direct state subsidies and state aid. However, 
as studies on the spread of (neo-)liberal institutions and the regulatory 
state rightly identify, major reforms have replaced many past institutions 
with new regulatory ones. Privatisation, the transfer of powers over mo-
nopolies and mergers to the EU and national competition agencies, rules 
designed to ensure ‘fair and effective competition’ and the abolition or 
weakening of planning mechanisms have all represented a move to-
wards competition-based regulation of markets. They have ended or lim-
ited traditional instruments of industrial policy. 
However, when looked at closely, these regulatory institutions have 
not ended industrial policy. Instead, they have offered new instruments 
for national policy makers. Legal and ownership privatisation have of-
fered instruments to shape the development of partially – state firms or 
fully private firms, as well as indirect forms of state ownership. The 
transfer of powers over mergers and acquisitions and a focus on com-
petition have allowed mergers and acquisitions by existing large Euro-
pean firms. Re-regulation of competition has provided several tools to 
aid firms, from licensing and licence conditions to regulatory standards. 
The decline of formal planning and previous planning organisations 
and increased reliance on ‘the market’ to direct choices of technologies 
and investment have permitted governments and independent regula-
tory agencies to plan and attempt to influence market choices through 
their orders and multiple objectives for a well-functioning market. 
The outcome has been a new form of industrial policy, operating 
through a combination of both traditional and newer regulatory instru-
ments. It is centred on aiding selected firms, particularly aiding Europe-
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anised or internationalised champion firms. These firms have a historic 
link with a nation state, often being former national champions, but have 
increasingly expanded abroad. Some are majority state-owned such as 
EDF. Others are minority state-owned such as GDF-Suez, ENI or ENEL, 
or indirectly state owned such as Deutsche Post or Lloyds and Royal 
Bank of Scotland. But many are state-supported privately-owned firms – 
from network operators such as Telecom Italia, British Telecom or British 
Airways to banks such as Barclays or Société Générale. 
Why have the new regulatory instruments not ended industrial poli-
cies? One set of reasons lies in the very nature of institutional reform: 
often change occurs through ‘layering’ in which new institutions are cre-
ated ‘on top of’ existing ones or through decay, in which old institutions 
remain but are left to decline [33]. Hence public ownership or planning 
organisations have not been entirely abolished. Second, more important-
ly, there are several different types of market structures that can be used 
to create competitive markets. Thus different forms of public ownership 
can be combined with competition. Equally, there are several possible 
meanings of ‘competition’ and modes of determining its protection in 
merger and acquisition control. Finally, initial attempts to focus purely on 
competition rapidly failed. Other objectives such as security of supply, 
aiding politically influential firms and national development rapidly re-
emerged. Making markets is an inherently political activity, and national 
policy makers have sought and found instruments to continue with in-
dustrial policies. 
The case of industrial policy supports wider arguments by recent 
‘statist’ literatures [34]. Far from disappearing, state activity has both 
shaped liberalisation and internationalisation of markets and adapted to 
these changes. National policy makers have found new instruments to 
aid selected firms. The present analysis advances such work by sug-
gesting which instruments have arisen and by examining how regulatory 
reforms have provided these new instruments. 
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